What caused the failure of nationalisation of the railway system in Germany? : Malfunction of the German Imperial Railway Office (Reichseisenbahnamt) in the 1870s and 1880s

Ayumu Banzawa

Discussion Paper 12-18

Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
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What caused the failure of nationalisation of the railway system in Germany? : Malfunction of the German Imperial Railway Office (Reichseisenbahnamt) in the 1870s and 1880s. *

Ayumu Banzawa †

Abstract

This paper identifies the causes of failure of the nationalisation of the German railway system by the Imperial Railway Office (das Reichseisenbahnamt; REA) that was established during 1873–1874 under the order of Otto v. Bismarck, the first Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler). The REA was not able to keep railways in the Reich (unified Germany) under its perfect control as provided by the German Imperial Constitution. What impeded the REA’s mission? We must pay attention to the REA’s problems as an organisation. As the official documents of the REA suggested, the organisation was not free from bureaucratic inflexibility in both structural and personal matters. Furthermore, compared with the other railway administration bodies in Germany in the 19th century, I point out the REA’s incapability in collecting regional information. The REA, the central bureau in the German-Prussian capital, had no regional unit. Its top-heavy structure and the higher-ups in the bureaucracy did not collect the non-lettering information from those who were doing the actual work at each railway, and this caused a criticized ‘disproportionate emphasis on documents’. To illustrate this point, I focus on the failure by the REA in playing the leading role in compiling the first German national railway statistics.

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Key Words : railways, Germany, nationalisation, statistics, the 19th century

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† Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

banzawa@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp
Introduction

This paper identifies the causes of failure of German railway nationalisation by the Imperial Railway Office (das Reichseisenbahnamt; REA) that was established during 1873–1874 under the order of Otto v. Bismarck, the first Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler). In the beginning of German unification, the Reich (the so-called second German Empire), Bismarck designed a national unified railway system. However, the REA that he founded was unsuccessful in creating a German national railway system; that is, nationalisation. This paper examines the details of the REA’s malfunctioning as a superintendent of railway nationalisation in this sense.¹

Much ink has been spent on German railway nationalisation in the 19th century. Too many studies on traditional railway history narrate institutional development.² In Japan, scholars who analysed German research have made many attempts to show the similarity of Japanese railway nationalisation with the German experience in the third-quarter of the 19th century. Japanese Marxist historians have often expressed ‘Bismarckian Nationalisation’ as a cliché to describe railway nationalisation, in which a government gave the military the highest priority. According to F. Engels, they considered that the authoritarian bureaucracy led Japanese nationalisation, which was, therefore, economically unnecessary such as the Prussian-German case.³

Over the past few decades, a renewed interest in railway nationalisation⁴ occurred and historians in Germany shed new light on the subject. From the angle of economic history that considered the importance of the effects of the leading sector of German industrialisation, the periodical work by Fremdling (1975) on German railway history pointed out the vitality of private railway companies alongside the insignificance of state ownership for the development of German railways in the 19th century. ‘The state-ownership (Verstaatlichung) reproduced merely this inefficient traffic performance, only on another level’.⁵ Fremdling also referred to a nationalisation and stated that, ‘(f)irst a state-ownership on the Reich level, like the one planned by Bismarck, could have prevented this (inefficiency)’.⁶ In contrast, Kocka (1987) stressed the influence of German state bureaucracy on railway management. This remark represented feedback on the evaluation of the American railroad company as the model of the organisation of a modern enterprise by Chandler Jr. Then (1997), who examined the organisation of German railways in detail and pointed out that the transition to state ownership was ‘the last entrepreneur’s decision’. Ziegler (1996) followed the development of railway policy of German land states and concluded the birth of the German intervention state in the process from the predominance of private companies over state railways to state ownership. In a Japanese study on German railway history, Yamada (2001) investigated the regional structure of German railway development and reviewed the research on Japanese railway nationalisation that referenced the German experience and criticized the notion of ‘Bismarckian Nationalisation’ from the standpoint that regional diversity (that is, not a national convergence) was essential to German industrialisation.⁷

However, those studies paid little attention to the REA, the incomplete headquarters of railway
nationalisation (nationwide unification of railway system and nation-state ownership) that was planned by Bismarck. To date, only a few studies have been conducted on the bureau, partly because Bismarck’s attempt was not successful in the end. The REA itself published no jubilee issues and the official documents on its organizational and personnel matters have been examined only fragmentarily.

One of a few exceptions is Kunz (1996), who offered the first historical grasp of the development of the imperial bureau. Kunz (1996) took a fresh look at the development of the REA, investigated its activities and evaluated its achievements. Research on the direction of examination of the REA as an organization has taken important steps, but closer study of the organisation is lacking. The question that has yet to be explored is what was lacking in the REA as superintendent of railway nationalisation. Even recent studies that referred to the REA, including Ziegler (1996), Mitchell (2000) and Yamada (2001), considered the failure of the nationalisation plan of Bismarck primarily in the political context; that is, the particularisms of Imperial Germany. Certainly, the problem of German particularism cannot be overemphasized in gaining a good grasp of the political and institutional development of German railway nationalisation. However, little is known about the role of the REA as an organization with a mission. Therefore, whether (and how) the bureau itself caused the failure of German railway nationalisation remains unsettled.

Therefore, this study considers the organisational problems of the REA. We focus on the early REA in the 1870s and in the beginning of the 1880s when it actively attempted to formulate railway policy.

This paper falls into three sections. Describing the political development of railway nationalisation by Bismarck and a legislative examination of the REA is desirable before addressing the primary objective of this paper, which is attempted in Chapter I through a discussion of a chronological list of events between the 1870s and 1880s. We then point out the necessity of analysing the organizational aspects of the REA, which started as an executive organ of the railway nationalisation laws submitted by Bismarck. Chapter II attempts to illustrate the defects of the REA’s organizational structure. A comparison with other organizations that administered German railways (the Association of German Railway Administration (Verein für Deutschen Eisenbahn Verwaltungen; VDEV) and the Prussian State Railways) is helpful in illuminating the problems of the REA. Chapter III focuses on the process of obtaining the first national railway statistics to analyse the reasons for the REA’s organisational incapability as presented in the last chapter. To end this section, we illustrate territorial conflicts between the REA and other official bodies (the Prussian Ministry of Public Works (Kgl. Ministerium für Oeffentlichen Arbeiten) and the Imperial Statistical Office (Reichs Statistisches Amt). In the last chapters, summing-up of examinations, we present an outlook on the background of the REA’s organizational problem, which was the precarious position of the Reich as an economic unit between regions and Europe.

I

Before possibly entering into a detailed examination, we must first attempt to clarify the chronological development of the REA. The results primarily from the foregoing research are presented in
Table 1. This abbreviated chronological table indicates that (1) the REA was originally designed to be the executive office for the Imperial Railway Law (Reichseisenbahngesetz) that aimed to place German railways under the control of the Imperial government, (2) the bills of the Imperial Railway Law were not realized as they were voted down in the Upper House (Bundesrat) in the mid-1870s, (3) especially after the rejection of the second bill and A. Maybach’s resignation as the President in 1877, the REA’s impotence in railway policy was obvious when compared with that of the Prussian Ministry for Public Works, (4) the heads of the bureau of the REA (given the vacancy of the President) repeated requests for an increase in the number of personnel at least in 1879 and 1885, but the government rejected these proposals and (5) by the mid-1880s, the significance of the REA’s existence was in doubt and the government and the Reichstag considered whether to continue or abolish the REA.

In sum, in the 1870s, the REA fell short of the Bismarck government’s expectations.

The question now arises: why was the REA incompetent in establishing a German national railway system?

That other German land states (Länder) and their governments claimed a degree of autonomy with respect to railway policy and held their position to the end, which is commonly accepted and seems to hold much truth. As Mitchell (2000) showed in full detail, ‘(i)n the German railway industry, particularism and not nationalism was triumphant before 1890’. 9

However, one thing is certain; the REA itself was frequently criticized for being impotent as a concerned authority. The second president of the REA, A. Maybach, who devoted himself to German railway nationalisation in compliance with Bismarck’s wish, decided to leave the post and moved to the Prussian Ministry of Public Works to pursue railway nationalisation through another channel, that of Prussian state possession of railways. What made Maybach forsake the newly established Imperial office?

Reflecting on the development in the 1870s and the early 1880s makes clear that central to the failure to create a national railway system was not only the problem of German particularism but also the inability of the REA as the executive. Even the Reich’s ownership of all German railways, as Bismarck first wished, was objected to and rejected by the German land state governments, the Reich-wide supervision of railways should have at least partially been realized, as the Imperial Constitution determined so au fond.

As previously noted in (4), the parties concerned (and contemporaries of those days) pointed out that the REA was too small with respect to finances and personnel. However, these characteristics failed to account for Bismarck’s rejection of the request for an increase in personnel. It is likely that Bismarck found other factors in REA that were responsible for the failure of railway nationalisation.

A general view of the organisation and a close examination of the personnel affairs of the REA in II provides the key to understanding the failure of the REA.

II
Kunz (1996) paid attention to the personnel aspects of the REA and made an important statement on the ability of President Scheele, the first president of the REA and who was censured for failing to start the organisation as a supervising bureau of the national railway system. His failure was not the result of his inexperience, as the retired Prussian finance official and ex-executive of Diskontgesellschaft was also the specialist of the railway as the director of the Berlin-Anhalt Railway Company. The efforts of the German land states stood in the way of the REA.\textsuperscript{10} Despite his (and Maybach’s, the second president) leadership and zeal, the REA made no satisfactory progress since its establishment in 1873. After all, the problem was not just lack of a top leader’s talent.

The argument that the incompetence of the REA brought about its unclear legal status\textsuperscript{11} because of failure to pass the law of nationalisation was convincing. Yet, was it impossible for the REA to adopt itself to the unfavourable institutional circumstance and pursue its original goal? Kunz (1996) evaluated that ‘the specialist competence of the office was undisputed’ in the 1870s.\textsuperscript{12} Why did such a competent office need to consider its abolishment after 10 years of existence?

One must extend the examination and focus attention on the human composition of the REA.

According to ‘The Handbook of German Empire (Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich)’ from 1882, the organisational structure of REA in 1881 was as follows. At the top of the bureau was the president (Präsident), but the post remained vacant since Maybach’s resignation in 1877. After he abandoned the activities of the REA, the leadership of the office was entrusted to the Councillors (Presentation-Councillors; Vorträgende Rate). There were the seven Councillors (Körte, Kraefft, Gerstner, Streckert, Wiebe, Crause and Gimbel) and, among them, three were administrative officials and four technicians. As the tasks were divided by field, they built the two departments in the office with each leader.\textsuperscript{13} Their titles were Privy Upper Governmental Councillor (Geheimes Ober Regierungs Rath) (5) and Privy Governmental Councillor (Geheimes Regierungs Rath) (2). The Emperor directly appointed the chairman and other councillors. In addition, at most two assistants (Hülfsarbeiter) could be appointed and Governmental Councillor (Regierungs Rat) Emmerich worked as the Permanent Assistant (Stänfiger Hülfesarbeiter) in 1881. In the secretariat, under the chairman were the Calculation Councillor (Rechnungs Rath) Ende, 14 secretaries and calculators, four registrars and six clerks. The Reichstag permitted almost 20 established posts. Added to these, the three Legal Members (Richtlicher Mitgliede) and three Deputy Legal Members (Stellvertretende richtlicher Mitgliede) were appointed from the governmental jurists from Prussia (2), Stuttgart (Württemberg), Darmstadt (Hessen), Mecklenburg and Bremen. They all were Nebenamt; that is, actively related to each governmental office. They were appointed for the so-called Augmented (verstärkte) REA, which was originally designed to be a kind of court of justice for German railways. However, this expected early function of the REA was unrealized.\textsuperscript{14}

What organisational problem can we identify in this, one of the highest Imperial bureaus?

First, we must point out the small-scale of the REA.

The REA located at Linkstrasse in Berlin has responsibilities of the German Empire as provided by the Constitution:

1. carry out the correct supervision of the railway system;
(Körte, Kraefft and Gerstner) and four technicians (Gimbel, Streckert, Wiebe and Crause). Whether this ratio of technicians was reasonable is an important and difficult question. While the REA’s main activity was considered about technical matters by the persons considered and the technicians held a majority of the board of executive positions, the chair during the vacancy of the President (1877–1890) was always held by administrative officials Körte and Kraefft, the eldest Councillors. After the retirement of Körte in 1887, Kraefft was promoted to the chairman of the board of Councillors through seniority. He immediately had to submit a request for time off of three–four months because of his poor health, but he maintained the position after returning to the office under Friedrich Schultz, who was the acting President (from 1887, seemingly as a result of the absence of Kraefft). Schultz became the third president of the REA in 1890. Before being appointed as the acting President of the REA, Schultz, who was born in 1840, was a jurist and worked in the directions of the Braunschweig Railway and the Alsace-Lorraine (Elsass-Lothringen) Railway. During the third-quarter of the 19th century, loud cries of discontent over the advantage that the administrative officials had over technical personnel in promotions and lifelong earnings were voiced among technical officials in the Prussian State Railway. We can safely state that such predominance of jurists in the Prussian State Railways was about the same in the REA.

However, the more crucial point is whether the arrangement of work in the REA was proper. We consider whether a ‘small scale’ or ‘shortage of personnel’ existed in the REA, which was deplored by the insider and the bystander only in this sense. A headquarters need not be large scaled. Because the augmented REA was not realized as of the beginning of 1883, Körte did not request Bismarck to make up for a complement of the Deputy Legal Members in the REA when von Monroya, a jurist sent on loan from the Duchy of Mecklenburg, was transferred to the High District Court in Rostock. Whether a supplement of a vacancy itself was to be realized was left in the hands of the Duchy.

In other words, the efficiency of the organisation depended on whether excessively heavy work was to be done by administrative or technical officials in line of organisational order. From this viewpoint, we can guess whether the task of technical officials on the councillor-board was excessive or inclined to the particular person(s). In 1883, after the death of Councillor Wiebe, a Prussian railway technician, the REA requested the promotion of Hülfsarbeiter Emmerich, a technical official in the Prussian State Railways, to councillor. Because A. Maybach, ex-president of the REA and Minister of Public
Works, interrupted this request to Bismarck, Körte refuted his claim that no need existed to fill a vacancy of technicians by listing the diversity of the technical tasks by the late Wiebe. The tasks were as follows:

1. handling overall timetable;
2. handling reports of the railway administrations and other presentations concerning railway accidents;
3. handling reports of railway administrations concerning late train arrivals;
4. handling matters concerning calling railway officers regarding the light railway formation; and
5. managing transactions to prepare the railway for military use of railways in the event of war.

Adding to these tasks, Körte suggested the significance of Emmerich’s task in connection with compiling annual statistics on railways for Germany. Meanwhile, he reminded the Chancellor on 3 August, 1881 of his former request to fill the vacancy for another assistant.

Evaluating the ability of the staff of the REA is difficult. Certainly, as indicated in Table 2, the Councillors were expert and veteran state officials. However, they sometimes brought criticism into the circle of state bureaucracy and on themselves through their achievements. The Councillor, Dr Gerstner, made an official report as representative of the REA, and suggested a form for statistics on railway transportation. However, his plan was almost ignored by the Imperial Statistic Office and the Prussian Minister of Public Works. Even by starting to compile statistics on railways, Scheele first asked the Austrian railway engineer, M.M. Weber, for a view on the introduction of the forms of Prussian railway statistics.

The criticism of the REA by A. Maybach is suggestive. When he was asked an opinion about promoting Emmerich to take over Wiebe’s tasks, as was previously discussed, he answered in the negative.

I do not know personally the Permanent Assistant in Imperial Railway Office and Government Councillor Emmerich. … From the enquiry into his earlier bureau works, Emmerich is a qualified and efficient technical official with apparently some too strong self emotion and pigheadedness. … I do not know if he has corrected himself in these points by now. … Thanking your Excellency for considering my opinion, I think, therefore, that it would be better if the promotion of Emmerich to the Presentation Councillor in the REA will be called off, and one will monitor him for a fixed period of time—at least six month—to prove himself, because he has never held leadership as a member of railway managing bureau (direction). … By a cancel of his promotion he cannot feel neglected incidentally with reason, as in his position he has already outshined a great number of the longer-serviced and almost equally qualified technical officials in the Prussian State Railway Administration.

Maybach devalued the ability and achievement of one of the leading technicians in the REA and began to criticize the REA’s present situation. His remark on the REA’s organisational problems deserves more than passing notice.

If one does not fill the Wiebe’s post temporarily, as long as I consider, it will not be an
official disadvantage. The right field is not found at present as a supposed far-reaching effectiveness of the REA, especially in the pure technical field. I must regard as a great, important thing that the REA will keep in closer contact with the Prussian Ministry that grasps all action and will try its best to avoid an unnecessary over production of documents (überflussige Vielschreiberei) that was the results of insufficient activity. 29

The lack of contact with the Prussian Ministry of Public Works and the ‘overproduction of documents’ must constantly be borne in mind in our further arguments.

Against Maybach’s opinion, Körte insisted again on supplementing Wiebe’s tasks in the REA by promoting Emmerich; however, the promotion was realized at length on 6 October 1884 as Maybach insisted. The realisation was the consequence of a petition by Körte on 10 September 1884, stressing that ‘Mr Minister of Public Works, as I can add on the basis of explicit authorisation, has no objection against the promotion of Emmerich’. 30 The Prussian Minister of Public Works had a significant influence on decisions made related to the personnel affairs of the REA.

The REA’s personnel matters were not completely independent because of the promotion of high officials through the organization and the appointment of Legal Members and Deputy Legal Members. By supplementing Legal Members in another bureau (Nebenamten) with personnel reshuffle in their main workplace, the choice of a new member was always entrusted to the governmental offices from which they came. 31

These aforementioned organisational problems of the REA that contemporaries pointed out were valid in these ways. However, the question remains unanswered on the essential factors that caused the failure of the REA as the headquarters of railway nationalisation.

Let us now examine the REA organisation in comparison with the other railway administrative bodies, including the VDEV and German regional state railway offices, especially Prussian State Railways. The VDEV was the international association of railway administrations in Germany and other western and central European states, and the ‘veteran champion of a mixed system of railroad governments’ in the 1870s. Maybach took umbrage at the VDEV’s achievement of technical standardisation and its generally admitted internationality. 32

First, the high-ranked officials in the REA and the executive members of the VDEV did not differ much in their careers. Table 3 shows the careers of the eight executive members of the VDEV from Prussia, who were conferred the decoration to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Association by the Prussian government in 1896. A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that almost all of the men of both bodies were bureaucrats. This is not just because the progress of Prussian state-purchase of private railway companies after 1879 and especially since 1884, but when the Berlin-Stettin Railway in charge of the secretary of the Association was state owned, the direction was grasped by the Prussian Royal Railway Direction in Berlin. 33 Clearly, as Kocka (1987) emphasized, the German bureaucracy in the 19th century was one of the most important personnel sources of railway managers. 34 They had in common a highly qualified educational background and passed official certifying examinations for administrator, jurist or technician without exception. When a railway officer was a technician, his engagement in the railway industry began
just after the start of his career. All of them were entitled to ‘Councillor (Rath)’, ‘Privy Councillor (Geheimes Rath)’ or ‘Upper Privy Councillor (Geheimes Ober Rath)’ by the government. These characters were given based on seniority. In REA, a Performed Councillor with the title of Regierungs Rat was promoted automatically after six years to Ober-Regierungs Rat in the same position. For a VDEV administrative member, the period of his engagement in the railway industry averaged (only) a little longer than an administrative Councillor of the REA.

If no great (and probably no essential) difference existed in the quality of the personnel between the bodies, problems can be found by comparing the structure of the organizations.

In the mid-1870s, the German state railway administrations had organisations with layers divided into two categories—the central administration (Central-Verwaltungen) and the special administrative branches (Speziale-Verwaltungszweige). The Prussian State Railways with the most complicated administrative structure concerning the preliminary works (Vorarbeiten), concession (Konzessionswesen), organisation (Organisation) and building and operation institution (Bau- und Betriebs-Einrichtungen) had eight strata from the Ministry of Public Works and Railway-Directions to the civil servants on site (railway maintenance persons, brakemen, porters and so forth). The administration of the Wurttemberger State Railway had a seven-layer organisation, and the Saxon and the Baden had six layers. The REA lacked such a vertical structure and the line from the top to the bottom on site and it had no regional unit. Certainly, this was often the case with a central bureau in the capital. However, the REA was not designed just to be an advisory board for the government. For the purpose of this paper, is it unnecessary to pursue a closer examination?

A comparison with the structures and personnel customs of the state railways and other railway companies in Prussia may be helpful. To point out the existence of an internal labour market (ILM) and the custom of ‘exceptional’ appointment of non-qualified persons to state officials in the Prussian (State) railways before the Prussian railway nationalisation goes to the very heart of our problem; what the REA organisation lacked.

A comparison with some conditions related to the existence of an ILM (lifetime employment, vertically divided structured career path (Laufbahn), non-wage befits and so forth) confirmed whether such a market was formed in the Prussian State Railways (containing the private railways that were state owned in the 1880s). Analysis of the personnel records allowed us to state that the employment relationship in the Prussian State railways had some features of ILM. Evidence of the establishment of long-time employment and a promotion process was found in each railway line from the relatively early phase of the state railways (since the 1850s). Each line likely had ILM before the progress of Prussian nationalisation. One explanation for the results may be that the Prussian state railways from the 1850s operated a promotion system with a job ladder that was rational and came from the view of introducing, securing and improving general skills and region- and firm-specific employee skills. If each private company and line operated its respectively peculiar ILM, the establishment of ILMs in the state railways was not an institutional decal or imitation of the Prussian state bureaucracy. The existence of plural ILMs fit in the regional-divided railway lines with each non-uniform organisation structure with the view of accumulating region- and
company-specific skills. Workers had to earn such skills during OJT in the Prussian railways for which off-JT was not sufficiently systematized before the 1880s. In the earlier phase of German railway development, during the line construction period in the 1850s and 1860s, cases of ‘irregular’ employment of non-qualified persons as government officials with the state railway existed. According to the basic regulation for the employment of civil servants in the state railways from 1850, only retired military men had the official capability of employment (Anstellungsfähigkeit) of low- and middle-ranking employees in the Prussian State Railways. The official record of employment in the state railway showed 74 ‘exceptional’ appointments of non-qualified persons to the Prussian official railway sector, in other words, people who gained appointment to the government office without authorisation. In the case of exceptional adoption, ‘the knowledge on the district’ (‘genaue Lokal- und Sachkentniss’) and ‘the merchant negotiation’ were often treated as the basis, coinciding with one aspect of the circumstances in railway construction: to have knowledge of the regional price difference for materials bought in the case that railway construction was recognized as the causa sine qua non of the railway engineer who ordered the construction work.

One may point out the function of ‘exceptional’ appointment in the Prussian State Railways during the ‘mixed system’ period before the nationalisation of the railways in the Prussian Kingdom. This appointment was a device to introduce and stabilize the necessary labour force that had regional and often tacit knowledge. The ILMs were also considered such a device.

For the early state railway system, some feedback between part of the work scene and the administration nucleus was indispensable for the development of management skills. The earlier established railway administrations developed the structure for this purpose. The VDEV, the association of railway companies and administrations, also comprised such a structure related to feedback between layers.

In contrast, the REA, the central bureau in the German–Prussian capital, had no regional unit. Its top-heavy structure and the higher-ups in the bureaucracy did not collect the tacit knowledge that came as non-lettering information from those who were doing the actual work in each railway vertically.

This defect offers the key to understanding the criticism by Maybach, as previously noted. As long as collecting (regional) information onsite was necessary for (national) administration, the absence of information suppliers at the relatively lower layers made it necessary for the REA to have a close connection with an organisation that had branches semi-nationwide, such as the Prussian State Railways, as Maybach insisted. When these connections were insufficient, as Maybach severely commented, the disproportionate emphasis on documents in the bureau was unavoidable. This organisational defect caused a bureaucratic demerit when attempting to collect the information.

Here, we may safely assume that the REA had a defect in its personnel device for collecting information, which was the essential organisational problem that caused the failure of administration in German railways.

However, room for further investigation exists. To possess actual proof for the argument, we must focus on the compilation of the first set of statistics by the REA from the mid-1870s to the early 1880s. One can compensate for lack of collection of individual embodied information by obtaining statistical data. If
one may state that the REA succeeded in compensating for its lack of data in this manner, the core of its organizational problem must be sought in other directions. An examination of the process of compiling railway statistics provides the key to understanding this matter.

III

Kunz (1996) summed up an examination of the REA and listed the ‘the achievements of the REA’. According to his evaluation, these achievements included ‘the introduction of unified instructions for railway building, management and traffic; the regulation of connection with military, post and telegraph administrations; the military organisation of railways during wartime; and the compilation of a unified statistic for all German railways’. Even a critic of those days said that the REA’s activities did not go beyond the statistical survey and recognized these statistics as the only achievement of the REA. However, a close examination of the process of compilation of the German national statistics of railways shakes this general belief and provides a good example that supports our argument in II on the organisational problems of the REA.

We will begin by gaining perspective of how the compilation of the national statistic progressed to the first issue in 1882. As shown in Table 4, before the foundation of the REA, the necessity of compiling statistics on the national railway was fully recognized by the Reichstag. In the beginning, Dr Hammacher, a member of the Reichstag, pointed out the necessity of clarifying the actual situation of the newly acquired Alsace-Loraine Railway in real numbers. He then referred more generally to the value of the publication of ‘official, reliable, comparable statistical numbers about management and situation of railways for the all German Empire, as have been made in the Prussian Kingdom for many years’. Ending his interpellation, Hammacher stated that great value for such a statistic for the German Reichstag was plausible. Herzog, the Federal Commissioner (Bundeskommissarius), consented to the request and the Reichstag decided to ask the Imperial Chancellor the annual publishing of the statistical survey of all railways in the German Empire based on a uniform foundation, as well as a yearly report on the administration, management and building of Alsace-Loraine Railway.

The compilation of railway statistics was one of the most counted tasks of the REA from the mid-1870s, almost at the start of the REA. On 22 September 1873, the President of the newly established REA (on 27 June of 1873), Scheele, was entrusted by the Chancellery. This order was not fulfilled immediately. The first publication of German railway statistics for the business year 1880–1881 was in 1882. From the very beginning, the complicated work needed significant time, and the work was also suspended in the latter half of the 1870s. In 1877, for example, a French advocate referred German railway statistics to the REA, but the REA replied that it was not able to comply with his request to send statistics on German railways, because ‘such a thing on our part has not been set up yet’. The REA recommended that the French apply either to each railway directions or the executive office of the VDEV for this matter, ‘because the latter has published a statistic of the German and non-German
railways that belong to the association for many years’. First, on April 1878, a plan for the standard forms of booking and statistics on receipts and disbursements by German Railway administrations was provided and, in February 1879, after detailed revisions, the ‘Booking-Form of German Railways’ was completed. However, even the introduction of this form to all German railway administrations since January or April 1880 resulted in the establishment of only a uniform base (gleichförmige Grundlage) of a compilation of national statistics. In fact, the complicated task of using table forms still existed, and finishing the forms took six months and a total of 42 meetings in the REA.

What caused this delay?

The REA explained that the delay was caused by the difficulty of the tasks, which resulted from German particularism. Among German railways, the booking forms were full of variety and a collection of necessary records for the compilation of a uniform statistic from many land states was laborious. From 9 June 1874, when the REA inquired with all railways regarding introduction of the Prussian form of railway statistics into future German statistics, a seesaw battle of arguments for and against the Prussian forms continued to 1875. To investigate all calculation patterns of German railways and their opinions, and then adjust individual needs with developing uniformity, the REA wasted too much time relying on the delegates from the Prussian Ministry of Trade. The Elberfelder Zeitung pointed out the lack of cooperation from each land state administration in the presentation of the necessary materials, although the REA denied that each government presented their materials ‘only in hesitation and with protest’, with the unsigned marginalia ‘?!’. A shortage of personnel can also be noted. In 1880, with the prospect of publishing the first statistics on German railways, the Buhren Zeitung commented on the necessity of increasing REA personnel. Accordingly, an increase by 12 posts was to be requested in the next budget bill because ‘one can now safely recognize that the current labour-forces in the REA were not enough to cope with the task’. The newspaper said that everyone who knew the preceding Information Papers of Prussian Railways (Nachrichten über die Preussischen Eisenbahnen), which were edited by the technician department of the Prussian Ministry of Public Works, would not be surprised that a great increase in the labour force of the REA was needed to regularly publish new railway statistics, such as the ‘Nachrichten’. Almost simultaneously, the Berliner Zeitung criticized the shortage of personnel using the compilation of the statistic and perfectly the same points.

Directing our attention to the measures that both of these newspapers insisted on is helpful for our understanding. The comments stressed that Maybach, Minister of Public Works, should lend the forms of ‘Nachrichten’ and should transfer a few officials in the technical department of his Ministry to the REA. The remarks shed light on the essence of the personnel problem, which was a delay in the compilation of statistics by the REA. We must focus on the REA’s lack of cooperation with the administration of the Prussian State Railway.

From the beginning, the REA depended on the Prussian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Public Works (the forerunner of the Ministry of Public Works), especially to make the forms of the railway statistics. Based on the advice from the Austrian railway engineer, M.M. Weber, who was chairman of the
Austrian imperial and royal commission, to work out a new Austrian railway statistics, the first President Scheele asked the Ministry of Trade to inform the REA if reasons existed to alter the orders and column-patterns of the Statistical Information Papers of the Prussian Railways.

However, a communication gap existed between the REA and the Ministry.

To clarify, we use an example from the negotiations between these government offices on the compilation of the statistics. From 1874 to 1879, the Prussian Ministry gave notices of 21 regulations used to make the Statistical Information Papers for the Prussian Railway administrations. Among these regulations, the REA was informed of eight. In 1874, three of all five regulations that were noticed from 1872 to 1874 were informed to the REA. From 1875 to 1878, almost none were informed; none in 1875, none of three in 1876, one of four in 1877 and none of three in 1878. However, three of five were informed in 1879. The promise of the Prussian Ministry of Trade in response to Scheele’s request in 1874 was broken from August 1875 to May 1879. In the autumn of 1878, the newly separated Ministry of Public Works was led by Maybach, the ex-President of the REA, but two regulations were not informed even in 1879.

Certainly, the contribution of Maybach’s Ministry was decisive. In the previously described case, one must pay attention to the dates of the issue of regulations by the Prussian Ministry and their notices to the REA, in addition to the number of correspondences. The two regulations of 21 October 1872 and 28 February 1873, before the establishment of the REA, were informed to the REA on 20 March 1874. On 8 April 1873, a notice of completion of the forms of 23 March 1873 was provided. From 1875, two were informed on the same day of notices of the regulation and one was informed in three weeks. The regulation on the alteration of the form of the tables that was noticed on the Prussian railway directions on 2 July 1879 was informed on 2 June 1879, before the Prussian notice. The Prussian Ministry noticed the REA of the regulation in advance, illustrating the re-start of the statistic compilation at the REA at the end of the 1870s with the help of the Ministry of Public Works.

During that final state of compilation for the first national railway statistics at the turn of the decades, lively discussions occurred between the offices. Detailed investigations on the plan of table forms were held intensively by cooperating with the Prussian Ministry of Public Works. From 1 December 1879 to 10 May 1880, the Commission had 42 meetings at the REA. The Commission consisted of five members from the Prussian Ministry of Public Works, one (Schultz, the future President of the REA) from the Imperial Office of Administration of the Imperial Railways (Reichsamt für die Verwaltung der Reichseisenbahnen) and two (Gerstner and Streckert) from the REA. After approval by the Commission at the last meeting, the REA ‘immediately’ sent 141 copies of the form to the Prussian Minister of Public Works (and other German railway administrations, including the Bavarian State Railways) on 30 May 1880.

However, immediately after the forms were sent to the railway administrations in the German Empire, the press criticized Maybach’s lack of cooperation, as previously noted. Because their argument for the need for an increase in personnel to compile statistics coincided clearly with the request for maintenance of special directions for creating statistical tables in the REA by Körte, we suppose that the
press comments reflected the REA’s intention. However, in 1879, the government rejected the request for increased personnel, as shown in Table 1.

Here, we recollect the critical comment regarding the performance of the REA in the 1883 by Maybach, as cited in II of this paper. The criticism of the REA’s lack of cooperation with the Prussian State Railway accorded with Bismarck’s reconsideration in 1877, after the second bill of law for nationalisation was discarded. Bismarck’s remark that the leadership of the REA was identified with that of the Prussian Railways implied his regret over the essential failure of the organisation of the REA.

Maybach stressed that the REA would maintain closer contact with his Ministry but did not expect that the two entities were on equal footing, especially after his transfer to the Prussian Ministry. What Maybach meant by keeping close contact with the REA was to subordinate it to his Ministry. Under Maybach, the Prussian State Railway administration was the perfect working bureaucratic organization, where the objectives of the central leadership were implemented at the lowest regional levels and the necessary information was absorbed from each level (that is, each official rank) through various paths. Maybach did not have a good opinion of the REA, because it was not possible for an office without such a well-functioned organisational structure to fulfil a complicated and nationwide task independently.

As the Imperial office under the ‘President’, the high officer directly appointed by the Emperor, the REA was not able to renounce its independence. From the start, the linkage with the Prussian Ministry of Public Works was inevitable for the national office without regional units, but perfect identification with the Prussian Ministry was impossible for a national office consisting of non-Prussian officials. The relationship with the Prussian Ministry had to be very delicate. The vacancy of the presidency after the resignation of Maybach was considered the symbol of the REA’s impotence. This impotence was reflected in the bureaucratic inflexibility of personnel affairs not only in the REA but also around the Imperial government. However, in a sense, it could help relieve the strained situation. For the eldest Councillor Körte, as the de-facto acting President, Maybach was his ex-superior in the REA. The activity’s dependence on the Prussian Minister of Public Works pretended to be very personal. However, Körte, who was unable to be promoted to the presidency, was a little older than Maybach and his career had no contact point with the Prussian railway office before entering the Imperial offices (see Table 2).

Nevertheless, Maybach did not consider such a delicacy. When the REA and the Prussian Ministry of Public Works became successful through a large part of the compilation of statistics on the first national railway, Maybach began to compile these distribution statistics (transportation of goods; Güterbewegung) on German railways without consulting the REA.

Since then, the REA has never been unconcerned with the compilation of national distribution statistics. These statistics were originally part of its task to compile railway statistics. At the latest, in 1876, Councillor Gerstner sent to the President (Maybach) the plan with reference to the former research and primarily after the trial products by the VDEV. This plan was transferred to the Imperial Statistics Office, but they returned it on 16 May 1877, replying that it had made the ‘Promemoria’ for recording the distribution by the German Railway and the plan for such recording and its necessary regulations, and sent them on 26 April to the REA. Beek, the Statistic Office, gave notice that a commission to compile the
distribution statistics would be called in the near future and recommended the REA wait for the progress on its results of the commission. The notice of regulation of goods transportation in the Prussian Railway Directions was not informed by the Ministry of Trade in 1876, because it believed that the REA was not compiling such a type of statistic. In this field, the REA tended to be criticized by the colleague offices and was not expected to succeed.

Meanwhile, on 15 July 1881, the Imperial Home Office (Kaiseramt des Innern) warned the REA that the Prussian Ministry of Public Works would collaborate with the Imperial Statistic Office in compiling distribution statistics. Boetticher of the Home Office informed the REA of the development in 1880 through a copy of a petition letter to Bismarck, and the list of members of the commission in the Ministry. After hearing the news that Maybach called a meeting of the representatives of the Prussian Railway Directions in the Ministry, the REA remained tranquil as it was criticized and claimed to demand an explanation of ignoring the REA from the Minister. According to the reply to the Home Office, the belief in the value of cooperating to compile such a statistic was expressed, ‘taking into consideration the compilation of general railway statistic that arose here’. Maybach responded curtly to the inquiry from Bismarck, as follows:

…The Director of Imperial Statistic Office, Imperial Privy Upper Governmental Councillor, Dr Becker, is given a special invitation to the conference. Giving consent to the wish expressed in the letter of the 11th August of this year, R.E.A. 8414, I have let the REA attend the conference of commission as it likes.

The experience of cooperation with the REA for the compilation of the first set of national railway statistics after many twists and turns confirmed the conviction of the Prussian Minister of Public Works that the REA had limited organizational ability and deserved no further cooperative task for the national unification of German railways.

Conclusion and Outlook

Therefore, we conclude the following. (1) Because of the discarding of the Nationalisation Law, the REA, as headquarters of unification of German railways, faced an organisational problem that it had no vertical structure with its own regional units. Its top-heavy organisational structure and the higher-ups in the bureaucracy did not collect non-lettering information from those who were doing the actual work at each railway. This defect caused bureaucratic inflexibility, including the criticized disproportionate emphasis on documents. (2) To supplement the organisational problem, the REA was linked with a perfect working bureaucratic organization that engaged in interactive information feedback in a vertical structure, that is, the Prussian State Railways under the Ministry of Public Works. (3) The failure in the linkage with the Prussian State Railway and ambiguous jurisdiction in railway administration led to the malfunctioning of the REA and unsatisfactory achievement of its activity to promote national unification of German railways.
From these observations, we determine the outlook that this failure reflected the precarious position of the *Reich* (Empire) itself. The *Reich* was unstable as an economic unit. More recently, Wolf (2006) showed the regional segmentation of the German market on its way to national unification in the 19th century. Viewed from this, the ‘German nation state’ in the 19th century was economically incorporeal. Therefore, we can say that the German national economy was left dangling between the economy of each region and the European sphere. The *Reich* economy was not a place where innumerable market information assembled automatically, and its central government had no tool for collecting such numberless information, with exception to the case of institutional compulsion. Such a compulsion had a limit, as was noted in one case of German particularism in the railway policy. In this sense, the miscarriage in the German railway nationalisation by the *Reich* governmental bureau was unavoidable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>The new Reich's railway policy belonged to the Reichskanzleramt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reich Constitution (Reichsverfassung) Art.4142.43.44 provide the authority of railway nationalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>10.May &quot;A Reich-Railway Authority(eine Reichs-Oberaufsichts-Instanz f. d. Eisenbahnen)&quot; was planned and introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not passed in the Reichstag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>7.March Plan for establishment of an Imperial bureau of monitoring Railways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bismarck Rundschreiben an d. Deutsch. Missionen as Foreign Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>27.June Bismarck Law of the Establishment of Imperial Railway Office to the Emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Gesetz ueber die Einrichtung des Reichseisenbahnamtes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>8.July F.W.Scheele 1. President (Prasident) (-9.5.1874)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>9.May Scheele resigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>17.May Bismarck Decree concerning &quot;the getting of a statistic survey of the complaint about railways&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1875 1. Bill for Imperial Railway Law (1. Entwurf eines Reichseisenbahnzuges)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>withdrawal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1876 &quot;The REA revealed its impotence&quot; (Kunz(1996))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bismarck regret the organisational failure that there was no identification of the REA with the Prussian State Railways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. Bismarck remarked &quot;Nationalisation has failed&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence of the REA in the railway policy was diminishing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>March Maybach assumed the office of the Ministry of Public Works.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Bill for prussian railway &quot;Verstaatlichung&quot;(making railways state-owned) to the Bundesrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Prussia could go it alone.&quot;= the acquisition of private firms by Prussian State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. A bill permitting an &quot;Verstaatlichung&quot; of Prussian railways was passed into the law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request of increase of personnel in the REA was not agreed by Bismarck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Feb. Prussia: Law empowered the Prussian State to proceed with the purchase of private companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dez. Considering whether to continue or abolish the REA in the Reichstag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Juni Bismarck ordered not to present a memorandum for post increase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1887 Korte resigned and Kraefft took over the heading of the bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schultz became &quot;temporary leader (Aussessarischer Leiter)&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Schultz complained the ignorance by the Bureau of the Majo-Domo and its decreasing significance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>Problem of the mobilising the army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bismarck and Maybach rejected the military request.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Entering REA year</th>
<th>Leaving REA year</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Körte</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>Admin.</td>
<td>Deputy of President, then Deputy of President by apperception judgement, then held of lawyer post (Assessor) in Glogen</td>
<td>R43/1447 pp.37-38, 41-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraefft</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Admin.</td>
<td>Deputy of President, then Chancellor, then as Railway expert</td>
<td>R43/1448 pp.26-28, 41-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stackelt</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Tech.</td>
<td>Permanent Assistant, then Councillor of REA</td>
<td>R43/1448 pp.26-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmerich</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Tech.</td>
<td>Permanent Assistant, then Councillor of REA</td>
<td>R43/1448 pp.26-28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* "Admin." administrative official, Tech. technical official

Table 3: Prussian recipient of order in VDEV in the beginning of 1890s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Entering VDEV</th>
<th>Free- from</th>
<th>Present Occupation</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Born in</th>
<th>First job</th>
<th>Entry of railway sector</th>
<th>Title/Orden</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>other orders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hartwoll</td>
<td>Head of the administration of Prussian railways</td>
<td>1839</td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1833</td>
<td></td>
<td>President of the royal direction of railways in Berlin</td>
<td>RAO 1.cl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Wagner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAO, KO 3.cl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Brauchtl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAO, KO 3.cl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Schubert</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1828</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KO, RAO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kogler</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAO 4.cl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Klee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAO 4.cl, KO 3.cl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Schubert</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1822</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAO 4.cl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sich</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KO 3.cl, KO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KO: Cross Decoration (Kreuz Orden)  
RAO: Red Adler Decoration (Roten Adler Orden)
The progress of compilation of the first German railway statistic by the Imperial Railway Office (the REA).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>The resolution of the Reichstag calling upon the Chancellery &quot;the yearly publishing of statistical survey in the uniform basis.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>The Law of Establishment of the Imperial Railway Office (Gesetz über die Einrichtung des Reichseisenbahnamtes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 Sept.</td>
<td>The Chancellery entrusted the REA with the task of compilation of the railway statistic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 Dec.</td>
<td>M. M. Weber, the Austrian railway engineer, advised the REA about the use of Prussian forms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>24 Jan.</td>
<td>The REA asked the Prussian Ministry of Trade to inform of the needs of revisions in the foregoing orders and column-pattern in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Statistical Information Paper of Prussian Railways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>The REA made a form of budget pattern on the basis of Prussian State Railways and referred to all German railways to the possibility of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>introduction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1875</td>
<td>German railways expressed the opinions about the form of REA, with strong opposition from the railways that had not introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Prussian forms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>In accordance with the commissionary advices from the delegates of Prussian Ministry of Trade the REA made the form of calculation and referred to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>all German railways to the introduction of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 Apr.</td>
<td>The drift of opinion in German railway administrations was toward the introduction of the form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Apr.</td>
<td>The negotiations with representatives of land governments and the VDP for the commissionary advices in the REA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 Feb.</td>
<td>The closing conference in the REA provided &quot;Standard Booking form of German Railways.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1877 Jan.</td>
<td>The Association of German Private Railways (Verein der Deutschen Privatbahnen; VDP) sent its opponent plan and the REA tested it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Sept.</td>
<td>The Prussian Ministry of Public Works sent the list of 21 regulations on the Prussian railway administrations (1872–1879) to the REA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>The 42nd and last meeting about making of the table forms was held and finished the form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>The press comments stressed the significance of increase of personnel for ongoing and future compilation of statistic in the REA, criticising Maybach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>The publishing of the first Germany railway statistic (&quot;Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahnen Deutschlands nach den Angaben der Eisenbahn-Verwaltungen bearbeitet im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt, Band 1&quot;)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Publications

Banzawa, Ayumu (2006), Doitsu-Kogyoka-niokeru-Tetsdogyo (The Railways in German
As Mitchell (2000) correctly noted, the establishment of state ownership (‘Verstaatlichung’) of the railways was often a different concept from the nationalisation (‘Nationalisierung’) that occurred in Germany in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. In the divided German Federation (\textit{Deutsches Bund}) and its successor, the German Empire (\textit{Reich}), many regional land state (\textit{Länder}) governments made railways in each of the states their own properties (‘verstaatlichen’), but state-owned railways were split into regional systems and a newly established German nation state (\textit{Reich}) owned almost no railways (except the newly captured Elsas-Lothringen Railway). ‘To speak of “the nationalisation of the Prussian railways from 1879 onwards” is perfectly oxymoronic’ (p.129). The ‘railway nationalisation’ that Bismarck planned was the unification of those regional railway systems into the German national system, and his goal was for the \textit{Reich} to own almost all German railways. In this sense, the railway nationalisation that Bismarck attempted in the 1870s was about consolidating railways \textit{under the Reich}, that is, the ‘Verreichung’ of railways. He and his comrade, Prussian Minister A. Maybach, progressed the Prussian state-owned railways with a view to compensate for the error of this Reich-wide unification of railways (Mitchell 2000, pp.127-129). In this paper, we need to restrict the phrase ‘German railway nationalisation’ to its original use.

For example, Kech (1911).

See Bogart (2009).
Fremdling (1975), p.60.
Mitchell (2000), p.84.
From (Schutz) to N.N. 17.02.1895, BA R43/1448, pp.26-28.26.
Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1882, pp.166-167.
See fn 54 and fn 55.
From (Schutz) to N.N. 17.02.1895, BA R43/1448, pp.26-28; 26.

From (Schutz) to N.N. 17.02.1895, BA R43/1448, pp.26-28.

From Maybach to Bismarck, 07.02.1883, BA R43/1447, p.10 (1-3): (3); From (Schutz) to N.N. 17.02.1895, BA R43/1448, pp.26-28; 26-27.

From Kötte to Bismarck, 28.02.1887, BA R43/1447, p.75; From Kräfft to Bismarck, 01/05.1887, R43/1447, p.76; From Kräfft to Bismark, 01/05.1887, BA R43/1447, p.82.


From Körte to Bismarck, 12.01.1883, BA R43/1447. pp.3-5.
As was previously noted, Körte once made a very negative comment on the need to replace a Deputy Legal Member and maintain the number of personnel because the Augmented REA had not realized by 1883. From Körte to Bismarck, 12.01.1883, BA R43/1447, pp.3-5.

From Körte to Bismarck, 30.01.1883, BA R43/1447, pp.7-9.
From Maybach to Bismarck, 07.02.1883, BA R43/1447, p.10 (1-3).
From Körte to Bismarck, 10.02.1883. R43/1447, pp.12-14.

From Gerstner to Maybach, 30.07.1876, BA R4101/137, pp.2-4, pp.5-59; From Beeke to the REA, 16.05.1876, BA R4101/137, p.68, pp.69-84.
From Maybach to Bismarck, 07.02.1883, BA R43/1447, p.10 (1-3).
From Körte to Bismarck, 18.09.1884, BA R43/1447, p.28.

For example, Schmalz, the Councillor of the Prussian Supreme Court and a Deputy Legal Member (from 27 October 1884) was transferred to the Councillor of the Imperial Court (Reichsgerichtsrath), and Körte of the REA asked Bismarck for permission to request the Prussian Ministry of Justice to indicate a suitable person to fill the vacancy with a Prussian judiciary (From Körte to Bismark, 14.05.1886, BA R43/1447, p.33.). About one and a half months later, Kraefft asked for the appointment of Roehsel to the post, who was a councillor from the Prussian Supreme Court. He was nominated by the Justice Minister (From Kraefft to Bismarck, 27.06.1886, BA R43/1447, p.35-36.)


For example, about the case of Gimbel, see From Kraefft to Bismarck, 14.04.1887, BA R43/1447, pp.80-81.

Banzawa (2006) used as a data source the examination of personnel documents of state railway employees primarily in the mid-1870s and 1880s; GstA, I.HA. Rep.89 (2.2.1), 29 419-452. They are part of the official records of the Royal Cabinet (Zivilkabinett), including petitions to the King. These official documents on railway civil servants were sent from each line and company to the Prussian Ministry of the Trade, Industry and Public Works (the Ministry of Trade), and were then brought up to the Prussian Privy Civil Cabinet (the Royal Cabinet).

The ex-private railway employees had to be re-educated to adopt the state bureaucratic institutions (in particular, accounting methods) after nationalisation of the railways in the 1880s (Schmedding (1884), p.448). This also suggested the existence of firm-specific knowledge of the office work process.

See GstA I.HA., Rep.89 (2.2.1) 29421, pp.154,189.


From the Chancellery to Körte, 22.11.1873, BA R 4101/476, unpaged.


‘Zur Beratung des im Reichs-Eisenbahn-Amt angestallten Entwurfes von Tabellen-Formen’ (10.05.1880), BA R/4101/477, unpaged.

‘Vorwort’ in: Statistik im Betriebe befindlichen Eisenbahnen Deutschlands , p.V.

Bühren Zeitung, 380, in: 01.08.1880, BA R4101/478, unpaged.

Berliner Zeitung, 178, in: 03.08.1880, BA R4101/478, unpaged.

From Weber to (Körte), 27.12.1873, BA R 4101/476, unpaged.

From Scheele to Aschenbach, 24.01.1874, BA R4101/476. unpaged.

‘Übersicht der fürdie Aufstellung der statistischen Nachrichten von den Preussischen Eisenbahnen an die Bahn-Verwaltungen ergangenen Bestimmungen’ (From the Ministry of Public Works to the REA, 12.09.1879), BA R/4101/477, unpaged.

See fn.57.

From (Körte) to Maybach, 30.05.1880, BA R/4101/478, unpaged.

See fn. 61.


See fn.27.

See fn.58.

From Boettiche to ‘the President of the REA’, 15.97.1881, BA R4101/137, pp.87-101:87.; The ambitious self-consciousness of the Reich’s statisticians in the Imperial Statistical Office as pointed out in Tooze (2001), p.21, is worth a passing mention.

From (Maybach) to Bismarck, 25.06.1881, BA R4101/137,pp.87-101:88-89.

BA R4101/137, pp.87-101:90-96.

From (Körte) to Boetticher, 11.08.1881, R4101/137. p.101.

From Maybach to Bismarck, 14.10. 1881, R4101/137, p.104.

Wolf (2009).